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Historically, asian financial systems have been dominated by banks. Lti many 
countries, these banks have been heavily controlled by the government, either directly 
or indirectly via the central bank. With its open-door policy, China had carried out a 
series of institutional and economic reforms that led to dramatic changes in the 
financial system in China. The People's Bank of China (PBOC), being the central 
bank in China, had been playing an essential role in China's economic transformation. 
From a monobank before 1978 to a formally designated central bank in 1984, the 
PBOC gradually picked up the role of a central bank in acting as a policy bank for the 
government, controlling the monetary system, supervising and regulating other 
financial institutions in China. With the launch of the Central Bank Law in 1995, 
the PBOC's duties and responsibilities were well-defined, and the law further 
signified its autonomy. Yet, the PBOC was still under the influences of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although the economic reforms 
and market competition had contributed to the changes of the role of PBOC, they 
were only the activator of those changes. In a centrally planned economy, the 
central bank itself is part of the government. It was only through the fundamental 
changes in the institutions in China that would drive the changes in the PBOC. All 
these changes helped to reduce the agency problem, transaction cost and uncertainty 
in the banking sector. 
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China's banking system was effectively abolished during the period 1949 -
1956. The pre-revolutionary banking system was nationalized in 1950，shortly after 
the communist party came to power. Most of the banking system became a 
department of the Ministry ofFinance, even through it was called the People's Bank 
of China (PBOC)[ Until today, the bulk of the banking system remains many of the 
features of a centrally controlled economy in that there are few price mechanisms to 
help allocating financial resources efficiently. 
The PBOC is the central bank, the monetary authority and the sole regulatory 
authority of the banking system. Its position was confirmed by the March 1995 
Central Bank Law and the July 1995 Commercial Bank Law. The PBOC was 
formally designated the central bank in 1984. However, the process of rapid reform 
and strengthening of regulatory mechanisms only began in June 1993 when vice 
premier Zhu Ronji was appointed the governor of the PBOC. Mr. Zhu was formerly 
the Mayor of Shanghai. With the passing of the Central Bank Law, Mr. Zhu saw his 
main task as completed and handed over the reins to Dai Xianglong at the end ofJune 
1 In this study, the PBOC will be used to represent the People's Bank ofChina. 
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1995. The move was seen as a way of emphasizing the independence of the PBOC 
from a machinery of the government. The key monetary aim of the PBOC was to 
develop indirect means of monetary control through the use of rediscount rates and 
open market operations. 
However, the Asian Currency Crisis and the collapse of Guangdong Trust and 
Investment Corporation further exposed the ineffectiveness of the banking system in 
China. Along a press conference held in Beijing in mid-January 1998，Dai 
Xianglong stated that "Our financial regulations are inadequate and supervision of 
financial institutions are weak. All these are problems accumulated over many years 
and reflect unresolved structural imbalances in the economy."^ Dai's frank 
admission highlights Beijing's concem that, if it does nothing to reform its financial 
system quickly, the problems that plaguing its neighbours will catch up with China. 
Up to now, China has survived in the region's financial meltdown because its 
financial system is closed, with the Renminbi exchange rate remains stable. In such 
a state controlled system, ordinary Chinese and foreigners cannot easily speculate the 
currency. 
Yet, China cannot hide forever behind protectionist mechanisms that it has 
committed to dismantle eventually in order to join the World Trade Organization. 
China's financial system might collapse on its own under the weight of massive bad 
loans in the banks' sector. According to the PBOC's estimation, there was about 
RMB 120 billions ofbad loans which worth 20% oftotal bank lending by the end of 
« 
year 1997. In order to guarantee the financial system can meet the needs of the 
economy in transition, significant efforts must be put on restructuring its fragile and 
2 "Defusing a time bomb." The Banker (March 1998): 51-52. 
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poorly regulated financial institutions, especially banks. As a central bank, the 
PBOC has always been an important part of direct central policy and will play a 
decisive role in the country's economic reform. 
Research Objectives 
Specifically, the purpose of this paper attempts to address the following issues. 
i) To identify the major roles and functions of the PBOC in China. 
ii) To study the evolution of the PBOC since China's economic reform 
in 1978. 
iii) From the perspective of institutional change, try to identify the 
reasons that contribute to the changes of the PBOC's role in the 
financial sector. 
Framework of the Study 
The study has eight chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 is a review 
on the literature related to central bank in China. Chapter 3 and 4 provide a typical 
central bank function and some background information about the current banking 
system in China. In Chapter 5，we have studied the role of the PBOC in China, 
including its formation, the underlying legal framework and its functions in China. 
Chapter 6 will focus on studying the evolution of PBOC's role after 1978. In 
Chapter 7，we will make a thorough study on the factors that drive the changes ofthe 
PBOC's role, with a perspective on institutional change in China. Chapter 8 is a 
concluding chapter that sums up the main points of this study and tums to look at the 





Numerous studies have been conducted on China's overall economic reforms as 
well as on sectional reforms such as the enterprise reform, price reform and fiscal 
reform. In a centrally planned economy, the financial system especially the banking 
sector is under the close supervision and influences of the central government. 
Many scholars were interested in studying the financial reforms and transformation of 
the banking system in China. 
Duncan Goldie-Scott (1995) had conducted a comprehensive review of the 
banking system in China. He presented a clear picture of the transformation of the 
banking sector from 1978 to 1995. Other scholars such as Hassanali Mehran (1996)， 
Xiaoping Xu (1998) and On Kit Tam (1995) had also studied the financial system and 
banking reforms in China. In their books, they reviewed the evolution of the 
banking system and the emergence of central bank in China. Reforms in China's 
financial sector have been introduced in the contest of the overall economic reform 
program initiated in the late 1970s. As in other sectors, reforms in the financial 
sector have been adopted in a gradual and continuing process, largely on an 
experimental basis. Before 1979，the Chinese financial system was characterized by 
its mono-banking practice with only three state banks, namely, the PBOC, the Bank of 
China (BOC) and the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC), operating in the 
system. Since only a sphere of responsibility was specified for each bank, the 
influence of these banks in resource allocation was small and their role in promoting 
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economic development was very limited and passive. The financial system was 
simply a tool to accommodate the central planning mechanism and allowed it to 
realize its physical output plan. 
Although there was no well defined blueprint to allow the financial system to 
resume its major roles, reforms were intended to mobilize more savings and facilitate 
a more efficient allocation of credit so as to promote economic growth. Xiaoping 
Hu (1998) pointed out that 
"Since the start of the reform, it has been increasingly clearer that the 
Chinese authorities wish to put in place a financial system modeled after 
the westem type with diversified financial intermediaries, a competitive 
financial market structure, and an effective regulatory and supervisory 
framework. It is believed that such a system could better promote 
efficient resources allocation and raise economic performance." 
Yet, none of the researchers have specifically studied the banking system with 
the focus on the legal aspects except L. A. Tokley & Tina Raun (1997). hi the book 
"Banking Law in China," they have provided a thorough study on the recent banking 
regulations in China and the duties ofmajor institutions in the banking sector. With 
the Central Bank Law and Commercial Bank Law passed in 1995, the whole banking 
system experienced dramatic changes. The law clearly states the duties and powers 
ofthe central bank that is a big step towards PBOC's independence from the central 
government. In addition, the law also emphasizes central bank's regulatory and 
t 
supervisory duties. It helps reducing the uncertainty and increasing the stability of 
the banking business in China. 
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However, Nicholars R. Lardy (1998), in assessing China's economic transition, 
argued that reform had done little to improve the allocation and use of China's capital. 
"China's financial system shares certain characteristics with the Asian 
countries engulfed in the financial crisis of 1997，including an excessively 
rapid expansion of credit, a bank-dominated financial system, weak 
central bank regulation and supervision of commercial banks, and a 
massive buildup of non-performing loans. Unless reformers can reverse 
the buildup of nonperforming loans to state-owned enterprises, the drain 
of poor lending decisions will reduce economic growth." 
Furthermore, financial reforms are a prerequisite to opening up China's banking 
market to increase participation by foreign banks, a step of international communist 
sees as essential to China，participation in the World Trade Organization. 
The opinion was further supported by a recent article on The Economist.^ In 
the article, the PBOC reported that state banks' bad debt loans were, at 5-6% of total 
loans, three times bigger than previously admitted. At a conservative guess, perhaps 
20% of the total loans outstanding (equivalent to 18% of GDP) were bad by the 
westem standards. It suggested that the banks had bad debts of $125 billion at the 
end of 1996. With a declared capital base ofjust $54 billion, China's state banks, by 
anybody's criteria other than their own, should have bankrupted three times over. 
Mr. Dai, in many occasions, had openly stated that restructuring of the banking 
system under the lead of the PBOC would be unavoidable. 
In the past 20 years, China's banking system had undergone tremendous changes. 
Liberalization of the Chinese economy, which began in 1979, had given rise to the 
3 "China's Economy." The Economist (February 14th 1998): 29. 
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equivalent of westem commercial banks and financial markets. The transition has 
been painful for some Chinese entities and, in some cases, for the Chinese 
government. However, many scholars who are interested in studying China have 
expressed a negative attitude towards the banking reforms in China. They noticed 
the benefits to China's economy after the initialization of economic reforms, but none 
of them agreed that the previous reforms in China were sufficient to save the country. 
One of the basic requirement for a healthy economic system is the existence of an 
independent central bank. In China, it was not until the launch of Central Bank Law 
in 1995 that the PBOC was given a formal authority to regulate the banking sector 
and yet it was still under the influence of the State Council. Various deficiencies in 
the development of the financial infrastructure, particularly in terms of prudential 




TYPICAL CENTRAL BANKJNG FUNCTIONS 
A fully fledged central bank usually entails a broad array of functions. In this 
section, we would summarize the monetary, banking, regulatory and supervisory 
functions of a typical central bank. 
Policy Function 
One of the major functions of a central bank is to carry out the Government's 
monetary and credit policies, in order to achieve desired macroeconomics goals such 
as stable price levels, high employment, etc. It should achieve the objective of 
stabilizing the level of economic activity by controlling the money supply and the 
availability of credit. To enable a central bank to perform this task effectively, it is 
usually conferred the sole right to issue notes in the territory, and in most democratic 
societies, it has a high degree of operational independence. With the control of 
interest rate, central bank can monitor the flow of currency in the market, e.g. the 
money supply. , 
hi addition, a central bank plays an important role as the center of modem 
payment system. Typically, it has certain obligations authorized by law such as 
controlling inflation and fostering the stability and soundness of the financial system. 
In controlling inflation, it is increasingly moving away from direct measures to 
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relying on indirect instruments. Participating in the open-market operations, 
changing the reserve requirements and discount rates are the three main instruments 
to implement monetary policy. A central bank not only acts as an agency for the 
government to allocate direct credit to other institutions, but also assists the 
government in controlling the fiscal policy. 
% 
Banking Function 
A central bank serves as the major "Banker to Government，” providing bank 
deposits and borrowing facilities for the Treasury. It also acts as the Government's 
“Fiscal Agent" and "Financial Advisor," as well as the custodian and manager ofthe 
nation's gold, foreign exchanges and Special Drawing Rights reserves. In the 
international monetaty relations, the central bank represents the nation in negotiating 
with international organizations such as the World Bank and Memational Monetary 
Fund. 
To the private sector, a central bank serves additionally as "the Bankers' Bank” 
It will provide short-term working capital loans available to enterprises in line with 
the annual national credit quota. By the virtue of the reserve requirement, the 
central bank keeps the cash reserves of the banking system, and in tum acts as the 
bank for central clearing, settlement, and transfer for private commercial banks and 
other non-bank financial institutions. A central bank is also the “Lender of Last 
Resort” Yet, there is a problem to distinguish between banks that face only a 
liquidity problem and those that are truly insolvent, that should be shut down because 




Central bank has the mission to supervise the whole banking industry, including 
the banks or non-bank financial institutions. Supervision of financial institutions is 
a function that has assumed greater importance in many countries with the 
liberalization of financial and the development of markets. There is no definite 
answer as to whether the central bank or another agency should undertake this 
function. There are pros and cons to separating monetary policy and prudential 
control，and country experiences provided a wide spectrum of successful solution to 
the problem. For example, in Canada and Germany, banking supervision is vested in 
a separate agency, although the Bundesbank in Germany assists the Supervisory 
Office in many ways. In the States and Japan, the central banks share formal 
responsibilities. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank foresees only a limited role 
for central bank in the area of prudential control, as the national authorities are to 
remain the main players in this area, and a certain coordinating role is envisaged for 
the European Central Bank. 
Under the stated regulations, a central bank has to regulate the banking system to 
ensure its financial health. For example, it has to ensure that all banks are subjected 
to stringent external audits. At the mean time of adopting government's monetary 
policy, it also has the duty to monitor those policies and make sure that they are for 
the benefits of the economy instead of solely for the government. 
t 
Developmental and Research Function 
In places where the financial system is under-developed, the central bank is 
expected to perform the developmental flmction of building up the whole financial 
infrastructure by tax incentives, liberalization, technology, or other methods. In 
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most countries, central banks are expected to monitor the financial sector closely, and 
to compile and publish financial statistics and other relevant information. 
The actual performance of these functions will vary among different countries, 
depending on their financial environment and needs. Each country may put different 
emphasis on each function and some functions may even not be performed. In most 
countries, central banking functions are handled by a non-profit-oriented and public-
sector-owned institution. Under this situation, monetary policy that requires strict 
subordination of individual's interests to macroeconomics' interests can be 
implemented effectively. In addition, this will avoid serious conflicts of interests, 
which may arise when private institutions are granted full or quasi central bank status. 
It is often argued that this would lead to unfair competition as those institutions may 
obtain special privileges or have access to confidential information. 
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CHAPTERW 
A REVBEW OF THE BANKEVG EVDUSTRY EV CfflNA 
The banking business in China is dominated by a small number of large state-
owned banks, more specifically, by the PBOC's monopoly. The PBOC functioned 
both as the central bank and as a sole commercial bank for the government. Apart 
from the PBOC, the banking system is composed of four state commercial banks, 
created initially as specialized banks for separate sectors of the economy, and three 
policy banks. In their shadow are a number of regional or national commercial 
banks. (Appendix 1: Structure of the Banking Sector) 
The Central Bank 
The PBOC is the central bank, with a vast network ofover 15,000 branches, sub-
branches, and offices, dominated China's financial landscape. It controls almost 
four-fifths of all deposits in banks and credit cooperatives, and is the source of 93 
percent of all loans by financial institutions. It is responsible for regulating the 
money supply, fixing interest rates, managing the state's holdings offoreign exchange, 
and supervising and controlling all other financial institutions. Before 1984，the 
PBOC was the only bank in the banking system, operating all branches. After the 
reform in 1984，PBOC's commercial and retail banking responsibilities were divided 
between the four state specialized banks - the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the 
Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank ofChina (ICBC), and the 
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People's Construction Bank (PCB). These five financial institutions formed the 
major framework of the banking system in China. 
State Specialized Banks 
\ 
The ABC was established to specialize in the making of loans and taking of 
deposits in rural states. However, since the economic reform the ABC had to branch 
out from its original purpose to encompass a variety oftransactions. At present, it is 
entitled to conduct a large variety ofbusinesses in commercial banking business and 
foreign exchange transactions. The BOC is China's oldest existing bank and it was 
primarily used by the State Council to conduct overseas transaction. Its major 
functions include settling trade and other foreign exchange accounts between local 
and foreign enterprises and banks; allocating foreign exchange; extending credit to 
enterprises involved in foreign trade and participating in joint venture investments 
abroad. 
The ICBC was separated from the PBOC in 1983 and operated as an 
independent bank on January 1984. Despite it has only recently commenced 
operations, the ICBC has developed rapidly. Its main focus is to accept deposits and 
make loans to industrial and commercial sectors in the country. In addition, it is 
permitted to deal with foreign currency. Recent estimates predict that the ICBC is 
the second largest foreign exchange dealer in China after the BOC. The PCB was 
established in 1954 to manage China's capital investments. ‘ Due to the active 
property market, the PCB is now one of the most predominant banking institutions in 
the China. Its main functions include handling allocations and loans for new capital 
and large-scale technical transformation projects; holding and regulating the 
investment funds of enterprises and supervising construction expenditures. 
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The specialized banks have certain independent functions and powers that reflect 
the change of China's banking authorities towards the role of the specialized banks. 
However, the independence of the specialized banks must not be overemphasized as 
the nature of the China economy is still very much a planned economy and the 
specialized banks are important tools for implementing macro economic policy. 
Indeed, despite the apparent independence, in practice most of the branches of the 
specialized banks are still subjected to directives of the head office ofthe PBOC. 
Policv Banks 
The "Socialist market economy" reform agenda arising out of the Third Plenary 
Session of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993，led to the creation of 
three new policy banks to take over all new policy or soft loans from the state 
specialized banks. They are the Export-Import Bank of China, the State 
Development Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank ofChina. 
..The Export-Import Bank of China provides long term financing for importing 
and exporting equipment and machinery for industries and sectors deemed by the 
state as being of strategic importance. Although it has to follow the policy 
directions of the State Council, it will be subject to the regulatory control by the 
PBOC. The State Development Bank of China handles new policy based lending for 
state sponsored capital construction projects, which was previously the responsibility 
of the PCB. The Agricultural Development Bank of China wiil be responsible for 
all policy lending to the agricultural sector that was previously the responsibility of 
the Agricultural Bank of China. 
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Other Commercial Banks and Foreign Banks 
There are four nationwide commercial banks and a number of commercial banks 
in China. Bank of Communication, which was established before the creation ofthe 
PBOC, is by far the largest nationwide commercial banks. It has been permitted to 
undertake various commercial activities although such activities are relatively 
insignificant particularly compared with the business conducted by the Bank of China. 
Although it can probably regard as the main competitor to the Construction Bank of 
China, it lacks the same ability as the specialized banks to tie in to particular large 
growth areas. Other commercial banks are mostly local commercial banks 
sponsored by various provincial governments, hi July 1995，China passed the 
Commercial Banking Law, guaranteeing independent management ofbanks under the 
regulation of an independent central bank. 
The central government also allowed the establishment of foreign banks, 
branches and representative offices in China. Since 1992, foreign banks were 
admitted to establish branches outside the five Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Haiman, Xiamen and Shantou. For example, the PBOC had given 
permission for four foreign banks to conduct Renminbi business in Shanghai in 1997. 
The four chosen banks are Citibank, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Industrial Bank of Japan. The move has been hailed 
as a big step forward in China's financial reform.^ There are however, harsh 
restrictions enforced on the amount ofbusiness that foreign banks can undertake, and 
the requirements for establishing foreign bank branches are still relatively strict. 
4 "China invites foreigners to trade in local currency." The Banker (February 1997): 58. 
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CHAPTERV 
ROLE OF PEOPLE'S BANK OF CfflNA 
AND THE UNDERLYmG LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Formation ofPBOC 
The PBOC was established on September 1，1948 with its head office based in 
Beijing. At that time, the PBOC was also established as China's State bank to 
undertake the functions of a central reserve bank. Apart from acting as the central 
bank, the PBOC also acts as China's note issuing bank and as a lender oflast resort to 
other banks established in China. The PBOC, has branches and sub-branches 
throughout the territory, is directly under the control of the State Council and 
supervises China's banking business. Moreover, and perhaps the most important, 
the PBOC is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the central government's 
monetary policy. Li addition, the State Administration of Exchange Control is the 
control body in charge of all foreign exchange matters in the PRC. This department 
is under the direct control of the PBOC. 
The PBOC is also responsible for supervising and dealing with foreign 
institutions in the establishment of foreign funded branches or representative offices 
in the territory. Moreover, it has a general regulation making capacity, which 
enables it to carry out its broad duties and exercise its powers through the use of 
regulations rather than guidelines or directives. The PBOC is thus a prominent 
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figure and will continue to be a prominent figure in the banking sector of China. 
(L.A. Tokley, 1997) 
Establishment of a legal framework for the Central Bank - PBOC 
Ten years after the establishment of the PBOC as China's central bank in 1984, 
the People's Congress enacted a law giving the central bank the power to perform 
central bank functions. The preceding reform years had increasingly shown the need 
for an autonomous entity with the power to regulate the financial system and conduct 
monetary policy. At the time that the Chinese authorities were reassessing the legal 
framework for the central bank, the case for giving central banks a high degree of 
independence from the political authorities was being made convincingly worldwide. 
However, the organization, role, and function of the institution in charge of monetary 
policy in China have to be assessed in light of Article 2 in the Central Bank Law and 
of the State Council in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. 
(Hassanali Mehran, 1996) 
Autonomy of the Central Bank - PBOC 
Developments in central bank legislation in several countries suggest that the 
establishment of a balance between central bank autonomy and the coordination of 
monetary and other economic policies is a crucial issue. Traditionally, central banks 
have been granted formal independence, but governments have retained enough 
power to influence important decisions. More recently, legislation has moved in the 
direction of granting full autonomy to the central bank in monetary matters, under the 
assumption that a strong and independent central bank would be in a better position to 
maintain price stability. 
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The Chinese authorities were facing the dilemma of having to give up certain 
aspects of the traditional political structure to allow the central bank more authority 
versus retaining the present decision-making structure, within which the PBOC could 
fulfill its mission in market-based environment. Yet, in the Chinese political and 
institutional setting, an autonomous entity separated from the state would have been 
inconceivable. Creating such an institution would have amounted to establishing 
an entity separated from the State Council without any authority, because the state, as 
represented by the State Council, is the source of all authority. The solution to the 
dilemma is reflected in the combination of the provisions of Articles 2 and 7 in the 
Central Bank Law, 1995 (Appendix 2: The Central Bank Law，1995). Article 2 
establishes an agency under the leadership of the State Council, which entrusts this 
agency with a high level of independence from all other levels of the government. 
Article 7 stipulates that in the exercise of its functions the PBOC shall be "free from 
intervention by local governments, or other administrative organs at all levels, public 
organizations or individuals." 
Primarv Objective of the Central Bank - PROC 
The past practice of giving central bank multiple objectives - promoting 
economic growth, full employment and price stability - has generated policy conflicts 
and made proper assessment of the central bank's performance difficult. These 
insights have recently led to a different approach whereby central banks are endowed 
with only one principal objective - the promotion and maintenance of price stability. 
In Article 3 of the Central Bank Law, 1995，it stipulates that "the aim of monetary 
policies is to maintain the stability of the value of currency and thereby promote 
economic growth” The relationship drawn between economic growth and price 
stability clearly acknowledges the assumption that the best way the central bank can 
promote economic growth in the longer term is by ensuring price stability. The law 
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makes no reference to the extemal stability of the currency. This is not unusual in 
modem central bank legislation, although in some countries the relevant law refers to 
domestic and extemal stability. The law is also silent on the responsibility for 
defining the exchange rate arrangements. This omission is consistent with the 
legislations in other Asian countries, although there is a tendency in modem central 
bank legislation to confer such responsibility on the government. fHassanali Mehran, 
1996) 
Functions of the Central Bank - PBOC 
The function of the PBOC used to be confined to managing the issue of currency 
and implementing the credit plan. However, the changing institutional structure of 
the financial system and the development of a market-based economy called for new 
functions for the PBOC. The direction in China has been to give the PBOC a large 
and direct responsibility in supervising the financial system. In Article 4 of the 
Central Bank Law, it clearly stated the ftmctions that the PBOC should perform. 
Those functions can be summarized into the following categories. 
Monetary Control 
Effective monetary policy also requires operational autonomy, that is, the 
responsibility for formulating and implementing monetary' policy. Recent 
development in central bank legislation points to the appropriateness of increased 
autonomy in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Under Article 
4，the Central Bank Law states that one of central bank's functions is “to formulate 
and implement monetary policies in accordance with the law” and to “to act as fiscal 
agent for the State” This leadership is reinforced by the establishment of a 
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monetary policy committee, placed fully under the supervision of the State Council, 
which is also in charge of prescribing its functions, organization, and working 
procedures. The establishment of the monetary policy committee can help establish 
the autonomy of monetary policy within the State Council and thus solidify the 
credibility of China's monetary policy. The PBOC, however, is fully responsible for 
implementing monetary policy measures. 
The key monetary aim of the PBOC is to develop indirect means of monetary 
control through the use of rediscount rates and open market operations, moves which 
would require more relaxed controls over interest rates used by commercial banks. 
The prime tools used by the PBOC to control the money supply are credit quota for 
each of the specialized banks, setting a ceiling on total lending when it wants to rein 
in money growth, and loans to the state bank when it wants to promote growth. 
However, because operating procedures for the conduct of monetary policy evolve in 
line with market developments, the listing of instruments in a central bank law should 
be general, with a minimum of specifications, to allow the central bank the greatest 
possible flexibility in conducting monetary policy. 
In the transition to market-based monetary policy, the Central Bank Law had to 
allow the continuation of direct controls while also providing a clear signal with 
respect to the direction in which the authorities wanted to go. The list of monetary 
instruments in Article 22 of the Central Bank Law reflect this shift from direct to 
indirect monetary management. All the instruments listed belong to the category of 
< 
indirect instruments, including the PBOC's buying and selling of government 
securities in open market operations and its use of reserve requirements. 
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Prudential Regulatory Control 
Supervision of financial institutions is a function that has assumed greater 
importance in many countries with the liberalization of financial systems and the 
development of markets. There is no definite answer as to whether the central bank 
or another agency should undertake this function. The decision in China is to give 
the PBOC a large and direct responsibility in supervising the financial system. 
Article 4 of the Central Bank Law specifies the role of PBOC as a prudential 
regulatory agency with the responsibility “to approve, supervise and administer 
financial institutions in accordance with regulations" and “to promulgate ordinances 
and rules concerning financial administration and business." Also, chapter 5 ofthe 
law deals entirely with the supervision of financial institutions, focusing on the health 
of individual institutions and the financial system as a whole. The establishment of 
supervisory authority of the PBOC over the state commercial banks gives the PBOC 
all the means needed for effective supervision. 
Currency Issuance and Payment Transfer Systems Control 
Managing the issuance and controlling the circulation ofRenminbi (RMB) is the 
basic function of the PBOC. In addition, it has the responsibility "to maintain the 
normal operation of payment, clearing and settlement systems." Money transfers 
between branches of any one of the specialized banks are handled within the banks. 
Transfer between different banks is first cleared locally, to the.local branch of the 
receiving bank, through some 2,200 local cities and country level clearing houses and 
then settled using the bank's internal systems. Settlement can take anytime from a 
few days to a few weeks, depending on the degree ofcomputerization ofthe branches 
involved. There were many reports of branches，settlement delay, leading to the 
PBOC to take more active measures in 1994 so as to supervise and monitor the 
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settlement performance within each bank. As a central bank in China, the PBOC 
also needs "to hold, administer and manage the state foreign exchange reserve and 
bullion reserve" and “to engage in relevant international financial activities in the 
capacity of the central bank of China." 
V 
Legal Entity 
A central bank must be a legal entity because it must be able to act as an 
independent legal person, that is, to have paid-up capital, to own assets, to enter into 
contracts, and to sue and be sued. A corollary to this issue is that of budgetary 
autonomy, which enables a central bank to undertake operations without having to 
rely on resources from the government budget. Since its establishment in 1984，the 
PBOC had been a line department under the State Council. The 1995 Central Bank 
Law is innovative in that it gives the central bank all the features of a legal entity, 
although it does not refer to the notion as such. Under Article 8 of the law, the 
PBOC is endowed with paid-up capital and, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 40, has to complete an annual balance sheet and a profit and loss account, to 
be published in an annual report. 
Moreover, Article 37 and 38 confer a reasonable degree of budgetary 
independence on the PBOC. However, Article 38 states that "losses sustained by the 
PBOC shall be offset by state allocations.，，The unusual provision that the PBOC's 
budget being incorporated into the central government budget and subjected to 
verification by the State Council reflects the present reality in China. Yet, the 
independence of the PBOC from all other levels of the government is reinforced by 
the PBOC's independent control over its budget. As mentioned in the Article 4 of 
the Central Bank Law, the PBOC is also "responsible for statistics, investigation, 
analysis and forecasting for the financial industry." (Hassanali Mehran, 1996) 
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CHAPTERVI 
EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE PBOC 
It is commonly recognized that the central bank has a responsibility for reaching 
a rational balance among three goals, which are 1) security, including security and 
stability of financial system and of the macro-economy; 2) efficiency of the financial 
system; and 3) promoting the healthy, efficient and stable development of the 
economy. None of them should be over-emphasized by sacrificing the others. Yet, 
this recognition is not consistent with the traditional ideology that has been popular in 
China for dozens of years. Mao Zedong once declared that during any period, one 
and only one of the main contradictions should be grasped and solved and then all 
other contradictions would be solved smoothly and automatically. Banking 
practices in china in recent years seem to be the outcome of this mode of thinking. 
The dependence of the PBOC on political leaders and governments accentuated such 
a bias. Under the mode of operations, planners can always pool enough resources to 
solve single economic problems at a time. As with many ofthe Chinese reforms, the 
changes to the structure and role of the PBOC have been through a series of small 
incremental steps. In this section, we will study the evolution of the role of the 
PBOC as a central bank in China. 
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PBOC asa“Monohank” 
The banking system before the reforms was characterized by an all-inclusive 
mono-bank system established in the 1950s. Under that system, the PBOC was the 
dominant domestic banking institution, basically serving as a "monobank" that 
handled most financial transactions and controlled about 93 percent of the total 
financial assets of the country. It acted as the "center or cash, credit and 
settlement," from which currency and credit were issued, into which cash held by 
urban residents and credit held by state enterprises and institutions were deposited, 
and through which the payments within the state sector were cleared. 
Two other specialized banks, the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC) 
and the Bank of China (BOC), operated as special departments within the PBOC. 
They acted mainly as cashiers, with their functions confined to the settlement of 
enterprises' transactions, the administration of funds for working capital and short-
term investment and the collection of household savings. Although there were 
specialized banks under the PBOC, they were not independent. The PBOC still 
monopolized almost all the banking activities. 
The specialized banks virtually served as departments of the PBOC, or 
departments of the Ministry of Finance,. During the 30-year period from the time 
the People's Republic was established to the beginning of the reform (1949-1978), 
there were several institutional changes to the banking system in China. However, 
the nature of the all-inclusive mono-bank system had never changed before the 
reforms. 
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PBOC as an Independent Ministry 
Shortly after Deng Xianping's return to power in 1978, the PBOC was created as 
an independent ministry, reporting directly to the State Council. This was the first 
attempt to remove responsibility for banking from the Ministry of Finance and the 
PBOC remained the entire banking system. Although the PBOC was restored as the 
country's central bank, it continued to perform certain “commercial’，activities and 
remained a department of the State Council. In order to improve the allocation of 
financial resources to specific sectors, the People's Construction Bank (PCB) and the 
Bank of China (BOC) started operating as independent specialized banks. The 
former handled the financial activities of the construction sector and the latter the 
foreign transactions. Another bank, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was 
established to take over the PBOC's rural banking business. A network of 60,000 
rural credit cooperatives was set up under the supervision of the ABC to provide 
small-scale rural banking services. Here, we can see that the PBOC gradually shift 
its commercial banking activities to other banking institutions and it acted as a 
monitory agency to supervise those newly established specialized banks. (Appendix 3: 
Structure of the Financial Sector in 1978 - 84) 
Following a 1979 directive of the State Council, the allocation of investment 
fUnds was to shift gradually from budgetary grants to bank loans, subject to interest 
rates and repayment of principal. Both the PBOC and the specialized banks were 
authorized to grant medium-term and even long-term (5-10 years) loans for the 
purchase and improvement of equipment and other approved investment projects. 
As a consequence, the composition of funds allocated to industrial enterprises 
changed rapidly from 70% in the form ofbudgetary grants in 1978 to 80% in the form 
of bank lending in 1982. Despite these changes, the PBOC continued primarily to 
serve the limited purpose of providing the credit needed by enterprises to implement 
the plan for physical output within the framework of central planning. Neither the 
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project's profitability nor the borrower's repayment ability was taken into 
consideration in the monitoring process. 
PBOC as the Central Bank 
\ 
In September 1983, the State Council formally established the PBOC as the 
country's central bank by removing its urban commercial banking activities. A 
fourth specialized bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was 
formed to conduct henceforth those activities. At this time, all the commercial 
banking activities of the PBOC were handed over to four specialized banks. This 
development formally ended the transition toward a flill-fledged two-tier banking 
system, as China became the first socialist country with a centrally planned economy 
to set up a two-tier banking system. (Appendix 4: Structure ofthe Financial Sector 
1984 - 88) 
bi January 1986，the PBOC's new mandate was embodied in provisional 
regulations when the State Council promulgated the Literim Regulations of the PRC 
on Administration of banks. According to those regulations, the PBOC was 
responsible for the conduct of monetary policy and the regulation and supervision of 
the entire financial system, as well as of money and capital markets. It was granted 
extensive regulation-making powers and considerable administrative power over all 
financial markets. The PBOC became functionally equivalent to a line ministry 
under the State Council, which implied that all economic and financial decision of the 
PBOC needed approval by the State Council. 
The new mandate shifted the PBOC's main objective from that of passively 
supplying cash and credit under the cash and credit plan to fulfilling the traditional 
functions of a central bank. The PBOC began reorganizing itself and developing 
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new instruments and working methods. However, the predominance of the credit 
plan and associated lending policy greatly reduced the PBOC's ability to perform 
traditional central banking functions. The PBOC's branch structure, like that of the 
specialized banks, was based on the administrative structure and hierarchy of the 
country, with branches at the level of the province, the prefecture, the municipality 
and the country. The city level took a special position, as it is not subordinated to 
the provincial level and has independent planning status. 
In the subsequent years, new banks were established at provincial level and were 
allowed to engage in foreign transactions in 1986. Two "comprehensive" banks -
the Bank of Communications which had merged with the PBOC in 1949 but remained 
in operation in Hong Kong, and the CITIC Industrial Bank that was permitted to 
compete with the state-owned specialized banks in all forms ofbusiness. 
Independence of the PBOC 
,During the period from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, all state specialized banks 
had reduced their dependence on grants and loans from the PBOC and were funded 
almost entirely by their deposit base and commercial borrowings. The change in the 
relationship between the government, the PBOC and the state specialized banks had 
taken some time to evolve. The impetus for reform was stepped up after the 
publication of the "socialist market economy，，reform agenda arising out of the Third 
Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993. The agenda 
included the aims of tuming the PBOC into a fully independent central bank, 
managing the supply of money and credit and interest rates through open market 
operations, and the creation of three new policy banks to take over all new policy 
loans from the state specialized banks. After Zhu Ronji was appointed govemor of 
the PBOC, three new policy banks - the Export-toiport Bank of China, the State 
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Development Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank of China, were 
created during 1994. The state specialized banks could still be directed to make 
policy loans but, in theory, would have these underwritten by the PBOC. 
On March 1995，a Central Bank Law was adopted at the third session of the 
eighth National People's Congress. The Central Bank Law asserted the 
independence and responsibilities of the PBOC. Its significance lay in the law's 
confirmation of the PBOC as the central bank authority with control over the money 
supply and the financial system, after more than a decade of struggles between 
various government departments. It was not until the Central Bank Law that the 
PBOC was given formal legal authority and relieved its responsibilities to print 
money to finance the government's fiscal deficits. 
Degree of autonomy for the PBOC 
Although the Central Bank Law has established a fair degree of operational 
autonomy, the PBOC remains an institution under the leadership of the State Council. 
This leadership encompasses the formulation and implementation of monetary, the 
nomination of the Governor and deputy Governors of the PBOC, the operations of the 
monetary committee, and the supervision of the PBOC budget. 
The Central Bank Law should be viewed as a further step in developing China's 
legal system and in developing a central bank with a strong ability to implement 
effective monetary policy. However, it reflects the new trends in central banking 
worldwide, as well as China's present stage of constitutional and legal development, 
in which the power is controlled by Party and vested in the State Council 
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Under such circumstances, greater independence from these sources of authority 
would most likely reduce the law's effectiveness. As such, the law falls short of 
westem concepts of central bank autonomy, but it creates a central bank with a well-
defined primary objective and a higher degree of autonomy than in some other Asian 
countries. In many aspects, the Central Bank Law does not break new ground, yet it 
builds on evolving practices and reflects the consensus build .on the many policy 




FACTORS CONTRTOUTEVG TO THE CHANGES OF PBOC'S ROLE 
From the previous chapter, we notice that the role of PBOC in China's banking 
sector has experienced some kind of changes in the past 20 years - from a monobank 
bank to a central bank. Factors contributing to the changes are institutional change, 
economic reforms and market competition. 
Institutional Change 
Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. They 
are the frameworks where human interaction takes place. What organizations come 
into existence and how they evolve will fundamentally influenced how the 
institutional framework, in tum they influence how the institutional framework 
evolves. Originally, the PBOC was only a dominant domestic banking institution 
that performed only as a deposit taker. During the period of economic reform after 
1978, PBOC acted as in independent ministry inside the government structure. 
PBOC's central bank functions have been continuously strengthened ever since 1984 
t 
when it started to function solely as the central bank, especially after the 
promulgation of the "The Central Bank Law" in 1995. 
Following the collapse of Guangdong bitemational Trust and Investment 
Corporation, a new reform package was carried out in the banking sector in 1998. A 
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new organizational structure has been established with the unified leadership of the 
headquarters, nine regional branches, 326 municipal sub-branches and 1,827 country 
sub-branches performing respective duties. The nine PBOC's regional branches 
would replace the previous provincial branches, which is a structure largely patterned 
after its US counterpart, the Federal Reserve Broad System. They have been given 
powers to act as banking regulators and to ward off provincial politicians who try to 
direct banks to lend money for their own projects. The new banking system also 
removes almost all of its more than 3,000 sideline enterprises as part of a drive to get 
the government agency out of day-to-day business. Hence, institutional change 
softens the agency problem in the banking sector. 
The integration of the PBOC's provincial branches also affects the transaction 
cost, which is the extra cost of conducting a transaction, whether those costs are 
money, time, or inconvenience, to the past，PBOC had a main branch in every 
province. They had to deal with the local provincial officials regarding monetary 
and administrative issues. Those local officials always want to strike for the bank's 
support in financing various provincial projects. The transaction cost involved was 
very high. After the banking reform in 1998, the governor of each regional branch 
had to monitor several provinces instead of one. Zhu Yongji requested the regional 
governors to guarantee that there will be "Five Nos" which means “no big financial 
crimes, no big cases of financial irregularities, of financial frauds, illegal fund-raising, 
unauthorized setting up of financial institutions and failure of major banking and 
financial institutions through corruption, mismanagement or other irregularities." 
Therefore, the new structure of integrating PBOC's provincial offices with a regional 
network helps to remove central bank branches from the sway of local officials, 
reduce the transaction cost and soften the agency problem in China. 
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Under the new structure, financial supervision has been strengthened. Risks 
associated with some financial institutions have been resolved by mergers, 
acquisitions, debt-to-equity conversions, closures and bankruptcies. The magnitude 
of law enforcement and criminal case investigations has been intensified, bi recent 
years, 26,006 persons have been penalized for violating laws, regulations and 
discipline. Li addition, the enforcement of foreign exchange regulations has been 
intensified to safeguard the yuan exchange rate stability and the balance of payments. 
The five-category loan quality classification method will apply to the whole banking 
system. Moreover, with the Central Bank Law and the new reform in 1998，the 
PBOC has better autonomy in monetary control in the financial system. While the 
credibility of monetary policy itself can improve its positive effect on stability, the 
independence of the central bank in formulating and implementing such a policy can 
help ensuring its effectiveness and efficiency. Hence, the PBOC will take advantage 
of the unified and vertical leadership mechanism of the central bank, carry out 
functions of the central bank by the rule of law and fulfill its responsibilities in order 
to safeguard the national financial safety and promote the economic development. 
As a whole, the changes of institutions lessen the problem of information asymmetry 
and uncertainty in China's banking sector. 
Economic Reforms 
The opening up of the economy has seen parallel reforms in the banking system. 
It was the open door policy that increased the commercial activities in China. Both 
Deng and Zhu wanted to carry out economic reforms to improve the economic 
situation in China. However, for a country to attract foreign investors, the existence 
of a healthy banking system is essential as most of the monetary transaction is settled 
via the banks. Investors would hesitate to go to the China market because of the 
weak financial regulations and controls. Therefore, at the time of carrying economic 
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reforms, a healthy banking system should also be developed to support the transition. 
In a normal economy, there is a central bank to supervise the monetary supply and 
regulate all the banks or non-bank financial institutions. Although the central 
government realized that there was a need to reform the banking sector, it was never 
an urgent proposal until the demand for economic reforms became jeopardized. It 
was under the need of the economic changes that accelerated the need of institutional 
changes in the government. The Central Bank Law passed in 1995 was a signal to 
foreign investors about the healthiness of the regulatory framework and the autonomy 
of the central bank. These institutional changes are supported by economic motives 
behind. 
Market Competition 
The banking sector is becoming more and more complicated. In the past, there 
was only one dominant bank. Yet, later on，the PBOC has been transformed into a 
central bank while the state specialized banks are being asked to commercialize their 
cooperation. Policy lending has been transferred to specialized institutions, 
underwritten by the state. New state commercial, joint venture banks and 
investment trusts have been allowed to enter the market. Rural and urban credit co-
operatives, which act like private banks, have expanded rapidly and provided a vital 
role for small and medium size business. 
In addition, the number of foreign banks has increased ‘with the increase in 
foreign investment in China. By the end of 1998, there were over 300 foreign banks 
operating in China. Although the PBOC estimates that it only takes two to three 
years for a foreign bank branch to move into profit, most of the foreign banks struggle 
to make money. They are restricted to one branch per permitted city and are only 
allowed to handle foreign currency business with foreign andjoint venture companies. 
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A well-organized regulatory agent, the PBOC, needs to strengthen the banking 
supervision in the banking sector in order to support the economic transition in the 
country. Hence, the increase in comprehensiveness and competition in the banking 
industry drive the central government to change the institutions, so as to give a well-
defined authority for the PBOC to supervise the local commercial banks, foreign 




The year 1998 marks the central bank's 50th anniversary. Over the past 50 year, 
the PBOC has remained committed to the stability ofRenminbi, the soundness of the 
financial system and economic growth. It has been long aware that the development 
of the socialist market economy requires a sound modem financial system. Li the 
past 20 years, various reforms were carried out in the banking sector. The most 
recent one was PBOC's branch network, which was previously based on 
administrative divisions, with one based on cross provincial economic regions. The 
restructuring of the branch network aimed at strengthening the supervision functions 
of the regional offices. 
In the "China Financial Outlook, 98,” Dai Xianglong, the governor of PBOC, 
stated the future direction ofPBOC. 
"Greater attention will be accorded to improving allocation of credit, 
economic restructuring and fostering new sources of economic growth. 
The ultimate objective is to meet growth and other macroeconomics targets 
in an environment of currency stability. Financial supervision will be 
strengthened by drawing on internationally recognized practices to 
encourage financial institutions to improve management and guard against 
risks. Domestic financial institutions will make joint efforts in providing 
efficient high-quality services, which will, in tum, build up confidence in 
China's financial system.” 
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It implies that the need to reform the banking sector is recognized in China and 
numerous efforts have been dedicated to strengthen the banking system. PBOC will 
be the major organizations to speed up and deepen financial reforms, and strengthen 
the financial supervision and regulation. 
However, various deficiencies in the development of the financial infrastructure, 
particularly in terms of prudential regulation and supervision, have been a major 
problem troubling the Chinese financial sector. They have already caused a number 
of shocks in the securities markets. The collapse of the financial futures market in 
early 1995 was a good example. The deficiencies are aggravated by the 
inadequacies in the financial accounting framework of the banks, and the 
backwardness of the payment system is reflected in the fact that at least 5 - 7 percent 
of the banks' deposits have to be placed with the central bank in the form of excess 
reserves so as to meet the operational needs. Further reforms and liberalization of 
the financial sector may be distorted and may even be dangerous ifthese deficiencies 
remain. 
As a conclusion, one should note that the PBOC is still under the control of the 
central government despite the establishment of various banking reforms. In the 
past 20 years, the changes in the PBOC's role and duties were the result of 
institutional changes in the country. As China remained a socialist state with 
centrally planned economy, the central bank would continually remain under the 
influences of the central government. The differences are that the PBOC would be 
4 
given more and more autonomy in adopting the monetary policy, supervising the 
financial market and monitoring the stability of the currency. 
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APPENDEX 1 
STRUCTURE OF THE BANKEVG SECTOR 
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State Specialized Banks Other Commercial Bank 
• Agricultural Development Bank of • ~"China Investment bank 
China • China Min Sheng Bank 
• Export-Import Bank of China • Guangdong Development bank 
• State Development Bank of China • China Merchants Bank 
• Fujian Industrial Bank 
PoHcy Bgnk$ • Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
• Agricultural Bank of China • Hainan Development Bank 
• BankofChina • Yantai Housing Savings Bank 
• Industrial&CommercialBankofChina • Bengbu Housing Savings Bank 
• People's Construction Bank of China 
Non-bank Financial Institutions 
Nationwide Commercial Bank$ • Trust and investment companies 
• Bank of Communications • Finance companies 
• CITIC Industrial Bank • Finance leasing companies 
• China Everbright Bank • Rural credit cooperatives 
• Hua Xia Bank • Urban credit cooperatives 
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APPENDDC 2 
THE CENTRAL BANK LAW, 1995 
LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CfflNA 
ON THE PEOPLE'S BANK OF CfflNA 
Adopted at the Third session ofthe Eighth National People's Congress on March 18，1995 
Chapter 1: General Provisions 
Article 1 This law is formulated for the purpose of defining the status and functions of the 
People's Bank of China, ensuring the correct formulation and implementation of the state 
monetary policy，estabUshing and perfecting macro control under a central bank and 
strengthening the supervision and control ofthe financial industry. 
Article 2 The People's Bank of China is the Central Bank ofthe People's Republic of China. 
The People's Bank of China shall formulated and implement monetary policies and exercise 
supervision and control over the financial industry under the leadership ofthe State Council 
Article 3 The aim of monetary policies is to maintain the stabiHty of the value of currency 
and thereby promote economic growth. 
Article 4 The People's Bank of China shaU perform the foUowing fimctions: 
1) to formulate and implement monetary policies in accordance with the law; 
2) to issue Renminbi (RMB) and control its circulation; 
3) to approve, supervise and administer financial institutions in accordance with 
regulations; 
4) to promulgate ordinances and rules concerning financial administration and business; 
5) to hold, administer and manage the state foreign exchange reserve and buUion reserve; 
6) to act as fiscal agent for the State 
I 
7) to maintain the normal operation of payment, clearing and settlement systems; 
8) to be responsible for statistics, investigation, analysis and forecasting for the financial 
industry; 
9) to engage in relevant international financial activities in the capacity of the central 
bank ofChina; and 
10) other functions assigned by the State Council. 
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In order to implement monetary policies, the People's Bank of China may cany out financial 
business in accordance with the relevant provisions ofChapter IV of this law. 
Article 5 The People's Bank of China shall report its decisions concerning the annual supply 
ofbanknote, interest rates, foreign exchange rates and other major issues specified by the State 
Council to the State Council for approval before implementation. 
The People's Bank of China shall immediately implement decisions on matters concerning 
monetary policies not specified in the preceding paragraph, and report on them to the State 
Council for the record. 
Article 6 The People's Bank of China shaU submit work reports to the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress on matters concerning monetary policies and its work of 
supervision and control over the financial industry. 
Article 7 The People's Bank of China shall, under the leadership of the State Council, 
independently implement monetary policies，exercise its functions and carry on its operation 
according to the law and be free from intervention by local governments, or other 
administrative organs at aU levels, public organizations or individuals. 
Article 8 The entire paid-up capital of the People's Bank of China is allocated by the State 
and owned solely but the State. 
Chapter H: bistitutionaI Structure 
Article 9 The People's Bank of China shaU have a govemor and a number of deputy 
governors. 
The person for the Govemor ofthe People's Bank of China shall, on basis of nomination by 
the Premier of the State Council, be decided upon by the National People's Congress; and 
when the NPC is not in session, determined by the NPC Standing Committee and appointed or 
removed by the President of the People's Republic of China. The deputy governors of the 
People's Bank of China shall be appointed and removed the Premier ofthe State Council. 
Article 10 The Pepple's Bank of China shaU institute a system wherein the govemor 
assumed the overall responsibiUty. The govemor shaU direct the work of the People's Bank 
of China. The deputy governors shall assist the governor in his or her work. 
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Article 11 The People's Bank of China shall establish a monetary policy committee whose 
functions, organization and working procedures shall be prescribed by the State Council and 
reported to the Standing Committee ofthe national People's Congress for the record. 
Article 12 The People's Bank of China shall, as necessitated by the performance of its 
functions, establish its branches as its representative organs. The People's Bank of China 
shaU exercise centralized and unified leadership and control over its branches. 
The branches of the People's Bank of China shall, as authorized by the People's Bank of 
China, be responsible for the supervision and control over the financial operations and for 
handUng relevant business operations in areas under their respective jurisdiction. 
Article 13 The governor, deputy governors and other staff of the People's Bank of China 
shall be diligent in carrying out their fimctions, refrain from abuse ofpower or malpractice for 
private interests or holding posts concurrently in any other financial institutions’ enterprises or 
foundations. 
Article 14 The governor, deputy governors and other staff of the People's Bank of China 
shall keep State secrets in accordance with the law and be obligated to keep the secrets of the 
financial institutions and the clients under their supervision and control. 
Chapter 皿 Renminbi 
Article 15 The legal tender of the People's Republic of China is Renminbi (RMB). The 
Renminbi shaU be used for repaying all public or private debts according to its face value 
within the territory of the People's Republic of China, which may not be rejected by any 
organization or individual. 
Article 16 The basic unit ofthe Renminbi is the yuan and the unites of fractional currency of 
Renminbi are thejiao and the fen. 
Article 17 Renminbi shall be printed, minted and issued solely by the People's Bank of 
China. The People's Bank ofChina shall make public announcements of the date, face value, 
designs, pattems and specifications ofanew RMB issue. 
Article 18 Any counterfeiting or altering of Renminbi is prohibited. SeUing or buying 
counterfeit or altered Renminbi is prohibited. Transportation, possession or use of 
counterfeit of altered Renminbi is prohibited. It is iUegal to destroy Renminbi intentionally. 
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Illegal use of the image of Renminbi on propaganda material, publications and other 
commodities is prohibited. 
Article 19 No organization of individual shall be allowed to print or issue coupons as 
substitutes ofRenminbi for circulation. 
Article 20 Damaged or soiled Renminbi notes shall be exchanged in accordance with the 
regulations of the People's Bank of China and the People's Bank of China shall be responsible 
for collecting and destroying the aforesaid Renminbi. 
Article 21 The People's Bank of China shall establish a Renminbi issue treasury and its 
branches shall establish subsidiary treasury. The subsidiary treasmy in allocating Renminbi 
issue fund shall act on the order to its superiors treasury. No organization or individual shaU 
use the issue fimd in violation ofthe relevant regulations. 
Chapter IV: Business Operations 
Article 22 The People's Bank of China may, for the purpose of implementing monetary 
policies, apply the following monetary poUcy instruments: 
1) to require a financial institution to place a deposits reserve fimd at a require ratio; 
2) to fix the base interest rates; 
3) to provide rediscount business for fmanciaI institutions having current accounts in the 
People's Bank of China; 
4) to buy and sell state bonds and other government bonds and foreign exchange in the 
Open market operation; and 
5) other monetary policy instruments defined by the State Council. 
The People's Bank of China may work out specific conditions and procedure when applying 
monetary policy instruments set forth in the preceding paragraph to implement monetary 
policies. 
I 
Article 23 The People's Bank of China shaU act as fiscal agent for the State in accordance 
with the law and administrative decrees and regulations 
Article 24 The People's Bank of China may organize financial institutions in issuing and 
cashing state bonds and other governments bonds on behaIfofthe financial department of the 
State Council. 
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Article 25 The People's Bank of China may open accounts for financial institutions as 
needed, buy may not provide the financial institutions with overdraft faciUties. 
Article 26 The People's Bank of China shall organize or assist in organizing financial 
institutions in settling inter-institutional accounts, coordinating such activies and providing 
such services. Specific measures shaU be formulated by the People's Bank of China. 
Article 27 The People's Bank of China may, as needed for implementing monetary policy, 
activities the amounts, duration, rate of interests and forms of loans to commercial banks, but 
the duration shaU not exceed one year. 
Article 28 The People's Bank of China may not provide the State with overdraft facilities, 
any may not directly subscribe and underwrite State bonds and other government bonds. 
Article 29 The People's Bank of China may not provide loans to local governments or 
governmental departments at all levels, or to financial institutions other than banks, other 
organizations or individuals , however,, the special fmancial institutions other than banks to 
which the People's Bank of China may provide loans as determined by the State Council shaU 
be excepted. 
The People's Bank of China may not act as financial guarantor for any organization or 
individual. 
Chapter V: Supervision over Financial histitutions 
Article 30 The People's Bank of China shall, in accordance with the law, exercise 
supervision over fmancial institutions and their business operations to maintain the legitimate, 
stable and sound operation of the fmancial industry. 
Article 31 The People's Bank of China shall, in accordance with the relevant regulations, 
approve the establishment, changes, termination and the business scope of a financial 
institution. 
Article 32 The People's Bank of China shall have the power to audit, check and supervise at 
any time the deposits, credits, settlements, bad loans and other business affairs of financial 
institutions. 
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The People's Bank of China shaM have the power to check and supervise the raising or 
lowering of interest rates on deposits or loans by financial institutions in violation of 
regulations. 
Article 33 The People's Bank of China shall have the power to demand financial institutions 
to submit balance sheets, statements of profit and loss and other financial accounting reports 
and material in pursuance of regulations. 
\ 
Article 34 The People's Bank of China shaU be responsible for compiUng comprehensive 
statistics and accounting statements for the national financial system and publish then in 
accordance with relevant provisions of the State. 
Article 35 The People's Bank of China shaJil guide and supervise the business operations of 
the State banks responsible for implementing State policies. 
Article 36 The People's Bank of China shaU establish and perfect its systems of control and 
check-ups and strengthen its internal supervision. 
Chapter VI: Financial Accounting 
Article 37 The People's Bank of China shall exercise independent control over its financial 
budget. 
The budget ofthe People's Bank ofChina shall be incorporated into the central budget after it 
has been examined and verified by the financial department of the State Council and be 
subject to the budgetary control and supervision of the financial department of the State 
Council, 
Article 38 The People's Bank of China shall tum over to the state treasury the entire profit 
from its annual income minus annual expenditure after drawing funds for its general reserve at 
a proportion determined by the financial department ofthe State Council. 
i 
Losses sustained by the People's Bank ofChina shall be offset by State allocations. 
Article 39 The People's Bank of China shall abide by the law, administrative rules and 
regulations and the unified State accounting system in managing its revenue and expenditure 
and in accounting and be subject to the respective auditing and supervision of the audit 
institutions and the financial department ofthe State Council in pursuance of the law. 
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Article 4d The People's Bank of China shall, within three months after the end of every 
fiscal year, complete the balance sheet, statement for profit and loss and relevant accounting 
reports, prepare its annual report and publish them in accordance with relevant regulations of 
the State. 
The fiscal year of the People's Bank of China begins on the first of January and ends on the 
thirty first ofDecember of the Gregorian calendar. 
Chapter VH: Legal LiabUities 
Article 41 Anyone who forges or mints currency, sell counterfeit Renminbi, or knowingly 
transports counterfeit money shall be investigated for criminal responsibiHty in accordance 
with the law. 
Anyone who alters Renminbi or sells altered Renminbi or knowingly transports altered 
Renminbi shall, ifthe case constitutes a crime, be investigated for criminal responsibilities and 
shall, if the circumstances are not serious, by published by the public security organ with a 
detention of no more than 15 days and a fme ofno more than 5000 yuan. 
Article 42 Anyone who buys counterfeit currency or altered Renminbi knowingly holds of 
uses counterfeit, or altered Renminbi shall, if the case constitutes a crime, be investigated for 
criminal responsibilities, and shaU, if the circumstances are not serious, be punished by the 
public security organ with a detention o f n o more than 15 days and a find of no more than 
5000 yuan. 
Article 43 hi the event that anyone illegally uses the image of Renminbi on propaganda 
material, pubUcations or other commodities, the People's Bank of China shall order the 
offender to make corrections and destroy the illegally used image ofRenminbi, confiscate any 
income illegally obtained thereby and impose a find of no more than 5000 yuan. 
Article 44 Li the event that anyone prints or sells coupons as substitutes for Renminbi for 
j 
circulation, the People's Bank of China shaU order the offender to stop the illegal practice and 
impose a fine of no more than 200,000 yuan. 
Article 45 hi the event that anyone violated the law or administrative rules or regulations 
regarding financial supervision, the People's Bank of China shall order the offender to cease 
the illegal practice and give administrative sanctions in accordance with the law; if the case 
constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal responsibilities. 
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Article 46 Ifthe person involved is not reconciled to punishment, he or she may bring up an 
administrative suit in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Article 47 If the People's Bank of China commits any of the following acts, the person 
directly in charge and other persons held directly responsible shall be subject to administrative 
sanctions; ifthe case constitutes a crime, they shall be investigated for criminal responsibiHties 
in accordance with the law: 
1) to provide a loan in violation ofthe first clause of Article 29 of this law; 
2) to provide financial guarantee for a unit of individual; or 
3) to use the currency issue fund without authorization. 
Should any of the aforesaid acts result in a loss, the persons directly in charge and other 
persons held directly responsible shall bear part of or all ofthe liabilities for compensation. 
Article 48 Should a local government or any other administrative organ at any level, or a 
public organization, or an individual coerce the People's Bank of China and its staff into 
providing loans in violation ofthe provisions of Article 29 ofthis Law, the person directly in 
charge and other persons held directly responsible shall be subject to administrative sanction 
in accordance with the law; should the case constitute a crime, they shall be investigated fro 
criminal responsibilities in accordance with the law and shall bear part of or all the liabiUties 
ofcompensation for any resultant losses. 
Article 49 Any stall of the People's Bank of China who divulge a state secret shaU, if the 
case constitutes a crime, be investigated for criminal responsibilities, and if the case is not 
serious, her or she shall be subjected to administrative sanctions in accordance with the law. 
Article 50 Any staff of the People's Bank of China who commits embezzlements, corruption, 
malpractice for personal gains, abuse of power, neglect of duties shall, ifthe case constitutes a 
crime, be investigated for criminal responsibilities according to the law, and if the case is a 
minor one, shall by subject to administrative sanctions according to the law. 
t 
Chapter VHI: Supplementary Provisions 
Article 51 This law shall go into effect on the date of its promulgation. 
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